

# Provability Logics of Constructive Theories

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Provability Logic

Friedman's  
Classical Problem

Friedman's  
Problem: the  
Constructive Variant



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# Overview

## Provability Logic

## Friedman's Classical Problem

## Friedman's Problem: the Constructive Variant

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# The First Incompleteness Theorem

Let  $T$  be a theory that interprets a reasonable weak theory of arithmetic like Buss'  $S_2^1$ . In this talk we will also consider the possibility that such a theory is constructive.

We write  $\Box_T A$  for  $\text{Prov}_T(\ulcorner A \urcorner)$ .

The Gödel sentence for  $T$ :

$$\blacktriangleright T \vdash G \leftrightarrow \neg \Box_T G.$$

We have:

$$\begin{aligned} T \vdash G &\Rightarrow T \vdash \Box_T G \\ &\Rightarrow T \vdash \neg G \\ &\Rightarrow T \vdash \perp \end{aligned}$$

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# The Second Incompleteness Theorem

We formalize the above reasoning in  $T$ .

$$\begin{aligned}T \vdash \Box_T G &\rightarrow \Box_T \Box_T G \\ &\rightarrow \Box_T \neg G \\ &\rightarrow \Box_T \perp\end{aligned}$$

We find  $T \vdash G \leftrightarrow \neg \Box_T \perp$ .

So the second incompleteness theorem follows from the first.

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# Arithmetical Interpretations

We interpret the language of modal propositional logic into  $T$  via interpretations  $(\cdot)^*$  that send the propositional atoms to arbitrary sentences, commute with the propositional connectives and satisfy:

$$\blacktriangleright (\Box\phi)^* := \Box_T\phi^*.$$

We say that  $\phi$  is (an) arithmetically valid (scheme) for  $T$  iff, for all  $(\cdot)^*$ , we have  $T \vdash \phi^*$ .

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# Löb's Logic

Löb's Logic aka GL is the modal propositional theory axiomatized by classical propositional logic plus the following axioms and rules.

- L1.  $\vdash (\Box\phi \wedge \Box(\phi \rightarrow \psi)) \rightarrow \Box\psi,$
- L2.  $\vdash \Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\Box\phi,$
- L3.  $\vdash \Box(\Box\phi \rightarrow \phi) \rightarrow \Box\phi,$
- L4.  $\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash \Box\phi.$

Löb's Logic is arithmetically sound for all classical theories that interpret Buss'  $S_2^1$ . It is arithmetically complete for all classical  $\Sigma_1^0$ -sound theories that interpret EA (Elementary Arithmetic) aka  $I\Delta_0 + \text{Exp.}$  (Solovay 1976)

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# Some Theorems

GL is complete for finite transitive irreflexive Kripke models.

A variable  $p$  is *modalized* in  $\phi$  iff all its occurrences are in the scope of a box. We write  $\boxplus\phi$  for  $\phi \wedge \Box\phi$ .

*Bernardi, de Jongh, Sambin*: Suppose  $p$  is modalized in  $\phi p$ .

- ▶  $\vdash (\boxplus(p \leftrightarrow \phi p) \wedge \boxplus(q \leftrightarrow \phi q)) \rightarrow (p \leftrightarrow q)$ .

*Sambin, de Jongh*: Suppose  $p$  is modalized in  $\phi p \vec{q}$ . Then, there is a  $\psi \vec{q}$ , such that:

- ▶  $\vdash \psi \vec{q} \leftrightarrow \phi(\psi \vec{q}) \vec{q}$ .

E.g. if  $\phi p$  is  $\neg \Box p$ , then  $\psi$  is  $\neg \Box \perp$ .

*Shavrukov*: GL has uniform interpolation.

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# The Constructive Case

Provability Logics of theories are not monotonic in these theories!

$iGL$  is sound for extensions of  $iS_2^1$ .

Principles for Heyting Arithmetic aka HA.

**Leivant's Principle**  $\vdash \Box(\phi \vee \psi) \rightarrow \Box(\phi \vee \Box\psi)$ .

**Markov's Rule**  $\vdash \Box\neg\neg\Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\Box\phi$ .

**Anti-Markov's Rule**  $\vdash \Box(\neg\neg\Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\phi) \rightarrow \Box\Box\phi$ .

In *classical* GL plus Leivant's Principle we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \vdash \Box(\Box\perp \vee \neg\Box\perp) &\rightarrow \Box(\Box\perp \vee \Box\neg\Box\perp) \\ &\rightarrow \Box\Box\perp \end{aligned}$$

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# The Problem

The closed fragment of provability logic is simply the logic for zero propositional variables.

Friedman's 35th problem was to give a decision procedure for the closed fragment of the provability logic of Peano Arithmetic, PA. (Friedman 1975) It was independently solved by van Benthem, Boolos and Bernardi & Montagna.

The van Benthem-Boolos-Bernardi-Montagna result holds for  $\Sigma_1^0$ -sound theories that interpret  $S_2^1$ .

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# Degrees of Falsity

Let  $\omega^+ := \omega \cup \{\infty\}$ . We equip  $\omega^+$  with the usual ordering and define  $\infty + 1 := \infty$ . Note that the successor function remains injective under this extension.

We define *the modal degrees of falsity* as follows.

- ▶  $\Box^0 \perp := \perp$ ,
- ▶  $\Box^{n+1} \perp := \Box \Box^n \perp$ ,
- ▶  $\Box^\infty \perp := \top$ .

We have:

1.  $\vdash (\Box^\alpha \perp \wedge \Box^\beta \perp) \leftrightarrow \Box^{\min(\alpha, \beta)} \perp$ .
2.  $\vdash (\Box^\alpha \perp \vee \Box^\beta \perp) \leftrightarrow \Box^{\max(\alpha, \beta)} \perp$ .
3.  $\vdash \Box(\Box^\alpha \perp \rightarrow \Box^\beta \perp) \leftrightarrow \Box^\infty \perp$ , if  $\alpha \leq \beta$ .
4.  $\vdash \Box(\Box^\alpha \perp \rightarrow \Box^{\beta+1} \perp) \leftrightarrow \Box^\beta \perp$ , if  $\alpha < \beta$ .



# The Basic Idea

Suppose  $\phi$  is a Boolean combination of degrees of falsity.

$$\begin{aligned}\vdash \Box \phi &\leftrightarrow \Box \bigwedge \bigvee \pm \Box^\alpha \perp \\ &\leftrightarrow \Box \bigwedge (\bigvee \Box^\beta \perp \vee \neg \bigwedge \Box^\gamma \perp) \\ &\leftrightarrow \Box \bigwedge (\Box^\delta \perp \rightarrow \Box^\varepsilon \perp) \\ &\leftrightarrow \bigwedge \Box (\Box^\delta \perp \rightarrow \Box^\varepsilon \perp) \\ &\leftrightarrow \Box^\eta \perp\end{aligned}$$

We now prove, by induction on  $\psi$ , that any  $\psi$  in the closed fragment is equivalent to a Boolean combination of degrees of falsity.

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# Target Theories

We can characterize the closed fragments for HA, HA + MP, HA<sup>\*</sup> and PA.

Markov's Principle MP:

$$\triangleright \vdash (\forall x (Ax \vee \neg Ax) \wedge \neg \neg \exists x Ax) \rightarrow \exists x Ax.$$

*Open:* HA + ECT<sub>0</sub> and MA = HA + ECT<sub>0</sub> + MP.

Visser (1985, 1994, 2002): solution for HA using translation methods and a computation of semi-normal forms modulo a suitable equivalence relation..

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# Theories of Degrees of Falsity

We write  $\alpha$  for  $\Box^\alpha \perp$ . We consider theories in the propositional language where the degrees of falsity are treated as propositional constants.

We work in a propositional language with the constants  $\alpha$  without variables. The theory Basic is axiomatized by Intuitionistic Propositional Logic plus  $\vdash \alpha \rightarrow \beta$ , for  $\alpha \leq \beta$ .

We consider extensions  $\Gamma$  of Basic.

- ▶  $\Gamma$  is *p-sound* if  $\Gamma \vdash \alpha \rightarrow \beta$  implies  $\alpha \leq \beta$ .
- ▶  $\Gamma$  is *decent* if, for every  $\phi$  and for every  $n$  larger than all  $m$  occurring in  $\phi$ , we have  $\Gamma \vdash n \rightarrow \phi$  implies  $\Gamma \vdash \phi$ .
- ▶  $\alpha_\Gamma(\phi) := \max\{\alpha \mid \Gamma \vdash \alpha \rightarrow \phi\}$ .

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# Salient Theories of Degrees

- ▶ **Stronglöb** := **Basic** +  $\{((\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow \beta) \mid \beta < \alpha\}$ ,
- ▶ **Stable** := **Basic** +  $\{\neg\neg\alpha \rightarrow \alpha \mid \alpha \in \omega^+\}$ ,
- ▶ **Classical** := **Basic** +  $\{\alpha \vee \neg\alpha \mid \alpha \in \omega^+\}$ .

1. Basic corresponds to HA.
2. Stronglöb corresponds to  $\text{HA}^*$ .
3. Stable corresponds to  $\text{HA} + \text{MP}$ .
4. Classical corresponds to PA.

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# From Theories of Degrees to Closed Fragments

Suppose  $\Gamma$  is a decent theory of degrees. We define the closed fragment  $AL_\Gamma$  by introducing a modal operator setting  $\Box\phi : \leftrightarrow \alpha_\Gamma(\phi) + 1$ . We find that  $AL_\Gamma$  is a closed fragment and that its theory of degrees of falsity is  $\Gamma$ .

*Intuition:* the box of  $AL_\Gamma$  is the strongest or most informative box for closed modal theories compatible with  $\Gamma$ .

We prove  $AL_\Gamma \vdash \Box(\Box\phi \rightarrow \phi) \rightarrow \Box\phi$ . In case  $\alpha_\Gamma(\phi) = \infty$ , we are easily done. Let  $n := \alpha_\Gamma(\phi)$ . We have:

1.  $\vdash n \rightarrow ((n+1) \rightarrow \phi)$ , since  $\vdash n \rightarrow \phi$ .
2.  $\not\vdash (n+1) \rightarrow ((n+1) \rightarrow \phi)$ , since  $\not\vdash (n+1) \rightarrow \phi$ .

So  $\alpha_\Gamma(\Box\phi \rightarrow \phi) = n$ .

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# From Theories of Degrees to Closed Fragments

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## Theorem

The closed fragments of HA,  $HA^*$ ,  $HA + MP$  and PA are respectively  $AL_{\text{Basic}}$ ,  $AL_{\text{Strongl\"ob}}$ ,  $AL_{\text{Stable}}$ ,  $AL_{\text{Classical}}$ .

I.o.w., we have  $CF_T = AL_{TDF_T}$  for these theories. We might say: we have 'box-elimination' for these fragments.



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